In Henriquez-Disla v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, the court addressed a battle of bad faith claims, the insured alleging breach of contract and bad faith for claim denials; and the insurer alleging insurance fraud in seeking dismissal of the insureds’ claims, and in pursuing affirmative relief under the insurance fraud statute, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2). The insured and his wife made certain misstatements in applying for insurance and in seeking coverage for losses from a fire and earlier theft. The insured disputed the materiality of these misstatements and raised issues as to intent, focusing on either a language barrier issue or that the misstatements were explicable, or de minimis in nature. The court went through each alleged misrepresentation in detail, and concluded that the insurer’s motion for summary judgment would be granted on the bad faith claim, but that the breach of contract claim could proceed. On the other end, the court denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment on the insurance fraud claim, and allowed that claim to proceed as well.
As to the bad faith claim, this was “premised on the denial of benefits, the investigatory methods utilized, and [the carrier’s] alleged use of [the insured’s] language barrier as a pretext to deny coverage.” The insurer countered that the insureds did not produce any evidence that the carrier acted unreasonably or in bad faith. The insureds attempted to counter this, by arguing that the carrier had admitted the insureds were not responsible for the theft or fire for which they were making claims.
Observing that an insurer’s investigation need not be flawless, and that negligence is not enough to show bad faith, the court agreed that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of showing that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying the claims. The court focused on the inconsistencies in the insureds’ statements, and that “there were sufficient contradictions in the testimony to justify [the insurer’s] decision. The court cited the principle that: “An insurer ‘may defeat a bad faith claim “by showing that it conducted a review or investigation sufficiently thorough to yield a reasonable foundation for its action.”’”
As to the contract claim, the insurer sought summary judgment on the basis that the policy should be found void for material misrepresentation. The court, however, refused to find the record so clear on material misrepresentation that this count could be dismissed. The court found “that it would be inappropriate on the current record to find as a matter of law that the inconsistencies … are material misrepresentations. As previously stated, innocent mistakes are insufficient to warrant summary judgment. …. As explained, many of the inconsistencies may be the product of miscommunication, misunderstanding, or a language barrier.”
However, this same lack of clarity also preserved the insurer’s fraud claim against the insured. To make out a claim under section 4117, the alleged false claimant must “knowingly or with the intent to defraud the insurer present false, incomplete or misleading information regarding a material fact.” The court had ruled earlier a jury could find that the “inconsistencies in Plaintiffs’ statements may be the product of miscommunication, misunderstanding, a language barrier, or an attempt to mislead the insurer.” Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.
The court did go on to make some significant observations on the insurance fraud statute. The court found the fact that the insureds themselves had no connection to the theft or fire for which they sought coverage insufficient to escape the fraud statute’s scope. Rather, the statute does not require them to be responsible for the loss itself. Rather, if an insured makes a false statement concerning a subject relevant and germane to the insurer’s investigation as it was proceeding, that could be a material misrepresentation under the statute, which could afford the insurer relief. Thus, in this case, “[s]tatements regarding the [insureds’] whereabouts at the time of the losses, how they learned of the losses, and resultant damages, among others, are clearly germane to the insurer’s investigation.”
Next, the court refused to grant the insureds summary judgment on the basis that the insurer failed to allege damages. The court recognized that the damages would not be known until after the trial had concluded, if the insurer were successful, and that such a damages determination “is routinely left for the court after a verdict has been returned in favor of the insurer. At that point, the counter-claimant presents the court with a request for expenses, costs and fees.”
Finally, the court observed that the parties disputed the insurer’s burden of proof under the fraud statute, i.e., preponderance of the evidence vs. clear and convincing evidence. The court stated the statute was silent on this issue, and courts were split on the issue. The court instructed the parties to do further briefing, as this would be an issue at trial. The court specifically directed the parties to address a Pennsylvania Superior Court case applying the clear and convincing evidence standard when an insurer is seeking to void a policy ab initio for fraud, and a 1998 district court case which had applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to section 4117, observing “that the legislature could have adopted a clear and convincing standard but did not….”
Date of Decision: February 10, 2015
Henriquez-Disla v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Company, CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-284, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15699 (E.D. Pa. February 10, 2015) (Hey, U.S.M.J.)